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The purpose of this paper is to see whether and how G-10 banks have complied with 
the 1988 Basel Accord. The interest of this study lies in the fact that the standardized 
approach to credit risk in the New Basel Accord is conceptually similar to the 1988 
agreement. However, very little is known about the reaction of non-US banks to the 
imposition of minimum capital requirements that make use of risk-weight categories. 
Building on previous studies, this paper uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze 
adjustments in capital and credit risk at banks from G-10 countries over the 1988-95 
period. The results show that regulatory pressure was successful in raising the capital to 
assets ratios of undercapitalized banks in Canada, Japan, the UK and the US but not 
in France and Italy. In addition, there is no evidence that undercapitalized G-10 banks 
increased or decreased their credit risk over the period studied. Interestingly, these 
findings are robust to the inclusion of a variable measuring the role of market discipline 
in influencing bank capital and risk choices. All in all, the results suggest that the 1988 
Basel standards were effective in that, subsequent to their adoption, undercapitalized 
G-10 banks generally increased their capital but not their credit risk.  
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1  Introduction 
  
One of the major developments undergone by the banking industry in the 1990s has 
been the worldwide implementation of the first Basel Accord that set minimum capital 
standards for internationally active banks. The Basel guidelines were originally adopted 
by the central banking authorities from 12 countries (all G-10 countries plus 
Luxembourg and Switzerland) in July 1988. Their implementation started in 1989 and 
was completed 4 years later, in 1993. The purpose of the Accord was twofold. First, it 
aimed at creating a level playing field for banks by raising capital ratios, which were 
generally perceived as too low in many countries. Second, and linked to this, it aimed at 
promoting financial stability by adopting a relatively simple approach to credit risk with 
the potential to distort incentives for bank risk-taking. 
More than fifteen years after the adoption of the first Basel Accord and while new 
regulatory guidelines are about to be implemented, it is fair to say that empirical 
research has not fully answered the following questions: was the 1988 agreement effective 
in raising capital ratios among banking institutions falling below the minimum 
requirements? How did banks respond to the capital adequacy rules, i.e. did they 
increase their level of capital, forgo risky projects or sell off assets? Did the new 
guidelines induce banks to modify the credit risk of their portfolio and if so, did they 
choose to reallocate their assets to riskier categories? Analysis of how G-10 banks have 
responded to the 1988 risk-based standards is of course crucial if one wants to gain 
insight into the likely implications of the New Basel Accord.  
The lack of answers to the questions raised above is largely due to the limited 
amount of data on capital levels and risky assets of G-10 banks. Indeed, these data are 
mainly confidential or hard to obtain on a standardized cross-country basis. Most studies 
focus on the US, while evidence remains scarce for other countries that were part of the 
Accord. Therefore, an important contribution of this paper is to shed further light on the 
impact of the 1988 Basel Accord by using data from six different countries: Canada, 
France, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. More precisely, I extend the simultaneous 
equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to a multi-country setting in 
order to analyze the relationship between changes in capital and credit risk at the G-10 
level. The model also allows for cross-country comparisons of undercapitalized banks’ 
behavior towards capital and risk.   3
The results show that G-10 banks close to the Basel minimum requirements raised 
their capital to assets ratios (except in France and Italy) and did not increase or 
decrease their credit risk following the introduction of the new capital adequacy rules. 
These findings, which are robust to the inclusion of a variable measuring the role played 
by market discipline, suggest that the 1988 Basel standards had generally the desired 
impact on banks’ behavior. In addition, I find that changes in capital and risk were 
unrelated for Canadian, French, Italian and UK banks, positively related for Japanese 
banks and negatively related for US banks over the period studied. This result, which 
holds both for adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks, indicates that banks in 
different countries adjust their capital and risk levels differently.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature dealing with the effects of capital requirements on banks’ 
behavior. Section 3 presents the data used in this study, while section 4 outlines the 
empirical methodology. Results are discussed in section 5 and some conclusions are 
drawn in section 6. 
 
 
2  Bank capital regulation and its impact on banks’ behavior  
  
  2.1   Review of the theoretical literature 
 
The main justification for regulating bank capital is the need to avoid the risk-
shifting incentive generated by improperly priced deposit insurance. Indeed, although it 
may promote financial stability in the short-run, risk-insensitive deposit insurance tends 
to reduce banks’ incentives to maintain adequate capital and may thus endanger 
stability in the long-run. The ability of capital standards to successfully eliminate this 
moral hazard problem has been at the heart of a theoretical debate for more than 20 
years.     
A first strand of the literature focuses on utility-maximizing banks using the portfolio 
approach of Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974). In this framework, Koehn and 
Santomero (1980) show that the introduction of higher capital ratios will lead banks to 
shift their portfolio to riskier assets and that the reshuffling effect will be larger for 
institutions which initially held relatively more risky assets per unit of capital. This 
effect occurs because flat requirements restrict the banks’ risk-return frontier, which   4
leads them to compensate the loss in utility from the upper limit on leverage with the 
choice of a riskier portfolio. One way to eliminate the risk-shifting incentive is to require 
banks to meet risk-related capital ratios, as suggested by Kim and Santomero (1988).  
These conclusions have been questioned on several grounds. Using an option model, 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) find that a higher capital 
ratio does not lead banks to increase asset risk. They contend that the utility-
maximization framework, which reaches opposite conclusions, is inappropriate because it 
does not adequately describe the bank’s investment opportunity set by neglecting the 
option value of deposit insurance and the possibility of bank failure. Within the same 
modeling framework, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) relax the assumption that banks invest 
in zero net present value assets and find that there are now plausible situations in which 
an increase in capital requirements results in an increase of asset risk.  
The portfolio approach is used again by Rochet (1992) who shows that when the 
objective of banks is to maximize the market value of their future profits, risk-related 
capital ratios cannot prevent them from choosing very specialized and very risky 
portfolios. In this case, risk-based insurance premia are in fact the relevant instrument to 
limit banks’ risk-taking. More recently, Blum (1999) also finds that capital regulation 
may increase banks’ risk-taking but in a dynamic framework. Using a two-period model, 
he shows that an intertemporal effect has to be considered in addition to the standard 
negative effect of capital regulation on credit risk. If banks find it too costly to raise 
additional equity to meet new capital requirements tomorrow or are unable to do so, 
they will increase risk today. This second effect will reinforce the well-known risk-shifting 
incentive due to the reduction in profits.        
In short, economic theory is unclear on whether imposing harsher capital 
requirements leads banks to increase the risk structure of their asset portfolio. 
Ultimately, the question of whether capital adequacy rules limit banks’ incentives to 
engage in moral hazard behavior is an empirical one. The next subsection attempts to 
clarify the debate about the risk effects of capital regulation by briefly restating the key 
rules of the 1988 Basel Accord and observing how banks can comply with them. 
 
2.2   Capital requirements in practice: the 1988 Basel Accord 
 
The 1988 Basel standards are almost entirely focused on credit risk, the risk of loss 
due to borrower or counterparty default. An amendment to incorporate market risk has   5
been issued in 1996, while the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has submitted a 
proposal for a New Accord in 1999. This proposal is based on three mutually reinforcing 
pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline) that 
allow banks and supervisors to evaluate additional types of risks like operational risk, 
thereby avoiding treating credit and market risks in isolation. Implementation of the 
New Accord, though probably not by all adopting countries, is expected by year-end 
2006. 
The key to the 1988 Basel Accord is the obligation for internationally active banks to 
continually meet two capital adequacy ratios, the so-called tier 1 and total capital ratios. 
Both ratios have the same denominator, which is a risk-weighted sum of banks’ on-
balance and off-balance sheet activities. A simplified formula of the risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) of a bank is given by:
2 
 
RWA = 0*(bucket 1) + 0.2*(bucket 2) + 0.5*(bucket 3) + 1.0*(bucket 4)               (1)
 
where bucket 1 consists of assets with zero default risk (e.g. cash, government bonds/ 
securities), bucket 2 of assets with a low rate of default (e.g. loans to OECD banks), 
bucket 3 of medium-risk assets (essentially residential mortgage loans) and bucket 4 of 
the remaining assets (in particular loans to non-banks). Thus, the denominator of both 
capital adequacy ratios represents the accounting value of banks’ assets adjusted for 
their individual risk. The tier 1 ratio and the total capital ratio differ by their 
numerator. The numerator of the former ratio consists only of tier 1 capital while the 
numerator of the latter ratio includes both tier 1 and tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital, also 
called “core capital”, consists mainly of stockholder equity capital and disclosed reserves 
whereas tier 2 capital or “supplementary capital” includes elements like undisclosed 
reserves and subordinated term debt instruments provided that their original fixed term 
to maturity does exceed five years. The difference between tier 1 and tier 2 capital thus 
reflects the degree to which capital is explicit or permanent. Total capital is the sum of 
tier 1 and tier 2 capital.        
                                                           
2 Strictly speaking, formula (1) is only valid for on-balance sheet assets. Off-balance sheet items 
are also assigned to four risk buckets but they involve additional weights reflecting the nature of 
the operation. See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, pp. 52-53) for the precise regulatory definition 
of RWA.   6
The 1988 capital adequacy framework requires banks to have a tier 1 ratio of at least 
4% and a total capital ratio of at least 8% with the contribution of tier 2 capital to total 
capital not exceeding 50%, i.e., the following inequalities must hold: 
 
Tier 1 ratio = Tier 1 capital / RWA ≥ 0.04                                                  (2)
 
Total capital ratio = Total capital / RWA =  
(Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / RWA ≥ 0.08           (3)
                                                  
Tier 1 capital ≥ Tier 2 capital    (4)
 
The regulation also limits general loan-loss reserves and subordinated debt which are 
eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital (see Table 1A in Appendix). The implementation of 
the Basel guidelines in G-10 countries occurred in two steps. Interim standards of 7.25% 
for the total capital ratio and 3.25% for the tier 1 ratio had to be met by the end of 
1990, whereas full compliance with the definitive standards was expected by year-end 
1992.  
Banks that wish to raise their capital adequacy ratio to obey the minimum 
requirements or for other non-regulatory reasons can use three types of balance-sheet 
adjustments: they can increase their capital level, decrease their risk-weighted assets or 
sell off their assets. This is summarized in equation (5), which decomposes the growth 
rate of the capital adequacy ratio of bank i into three terms: the growth rate of capital, 
the growth rate of the credit risk ratio and the growth rate of total assets (a proof is 
given in Appendix): 
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
CAR K RISK A
CAR K RISK A
=- -
∆∆ ∆∆
                                                                                     (5)     
 
where  CAR = K / RWA = capital adequacy ratio (tier 1 ratio or total capital ratio)  
  K = capital (tier 1 capital or total capital) 
  RISK = RWA / A = credit risk ratio 
  A = total assets 
  t denotes time   7
From equation (5), it can be seen that a mandatory increase in the capital adequacy 
ratio (K/RWA) does not prevent banks from simultaneously increasing their capital 
level (K) and their credit risk ratio (RWA/A) provided that the growth rate of the 
credit risk ratio is lower than the growth rate of capital (holding total assets constant). 
Thus, banks may well have reacted to the 1988 Basel Accord by engaging in moral 
hazard behavior as first predicted by Koehn and Santomero (1980).   
In the remainder of the paper, I focus on the relationship between changes in the 
capital to assets ratio (K/A) and the credit risk ratio (RWA/A) of G-10 banks over the 
1988-95 period. Furthermore, I analyze the behavior of banks which were close to the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements, as these banks should have had a stronger 
response to capital regulation than better capitalized banks if the Basel standards were 
effective in leveling the playing field for G-10 banks.   
 
2.3   Review of the empirical literature 
 
The main papers that investigated the impact of the Basel capital requirements on 
banks’ behavior are listed in Table 1. With the exception of Ediz et al. (1998), all use 
the simultaneous equations approach which is described in section 4. This modeling 
framework allows to compare the behavior of undercapitalized and adequately 
capitalized banks with respect to changes in capital and risk and to see whether these 
changes are related. The studies surveyed in Table 1 generally support the idea that 
undercapitalized banks (i.e., those failing to achieve the Basel requirements) increased 
their capital to assets ratios in the first half of the 1990s. A similar phenomenon is 
observed for adequately capitalized institutions, although to a lesser extent. 
Furthermore, there is little consensus among the papers reviewed on whether banks — 
adequately capitalized or not — engaged in riskier activities. Finally, changes in capital 
and credit risk appear to be mostly unrelated. 
Results of US studies are difficult to interpret as the implementation of the second 
stage of the Basel Accord, between end-1990 and end-1992, coincides with the passage of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in December 
1991. Section 131 of FDICIA, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), goes one step further 
than the Basel Accord by defining three regulatory ratios (the Basel capital standards 
plus a leverage requirement) and five categories into which banks are classified according 
to their compliance with the three ratios. Thus, it is hard to ascribe the findings of the   8
two papers by Aggarwal and Jacques (1997, 2001) to FDICIA or the Basel Accord, as 
US banks’ behavior is likely to have been affected by both regulations over the period 
that they consider. Jacques and Nigro (1997) avoid this problem by focusing on the 
years 1990-91, i.e. the period before FDICIA was passed. However, the very small 
number of undercapitalized institutions in their sample - less than 2% of the total 
number of banks - may reduce the reliability of some of their estimates.  
Three papers present some non-US evidence regarding the relationship between 
capital and credit risk: Ediz et al. (1998) base their study on confidential UK data 
whereas Rime (2001) uses Swiss data and Heid et al. (2004) employ German data. Like 
other studies listed in Table 1, the first of these papers uses a partial adjustment 
framework but, unlike them, treats changes in capital and risk-taking as two separate 
decisions. Surprisingly, Ediz et al.’s model leads to the result that banks adjust their 
capital levels each year by more than the difference between the current level and the 
target they have in mind, which means that banks overshoot the target (and by a higher 
amount each year). The study by Rime (2001) is interesting because it provides the first 
application of the simultaneous-equations model reviewed in section 4 to non-US banks. 
However, Rime adopts the PCA regulatory classification to measure regulatory pressure 
on Swiss banks, which might be inappropriate given that the additional requirements set 
by PCA have not been adopted formally by any other country besides the US.
3 The 
paper by Heid et al. (2004) investigates the relation between capital and risk levels by 
looking at a sample of German savings banks over a slightly different period (1993-2000) 
than the other papers. The main finding of the authors is that the coordination between 
capital and risk depends on the capital buffer of banks. Banks with low capital buffers 
attempt to rebuild an appropriate capital buffer by decreasing risk and increasing capital 
simultaneously while banks with high capital buffers attempt to maintain their capital 
buffer by increasing risk when capital increases.   
Finally, a study by Sheldon (1996) looks at the risk effects of capital adequacy rules 
on eleven G-10 countries using an option-pricing framework. Sheldon’s main result is 
that the Basel Accord did not have a risk-increasing impact on banks’ portfolio but is a 
bit difficult to interpret as he is does not control for regulatory and non-regulatory 
influences. Moreover, his sample is not always representative of the banking industry of 
each G-10 country as some countries are only represented by very small banks.  
                                                           
3 Rime also uses a regulatory pressure variable similar to mine, which does not alter his results.   9
  Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to extend the empirical literature on 
the effects of the 1988 Basel Accord by using a simultaneous-equations model for six 
different countries along with a representative data set, the construction of which is 
detailed in the next section.  
 
 
3  Data source and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1   Data source 
 
Data were obtained from Bankscope, a database of bank account figures. Consistent 
with most studies on the impact of the Basel requirements, I chose to restrict the sample 
to commercial banks over the 1988-95 period.
4 All the variables used in this paper were 
available on Bankscope, except the credit risk ratio of banks. Therefore, capital adequacy 
ratios (CAR), capital levels (K) and total assets (A) were extracted from the database in 











==                                                                                                      (6)       







=                                                                                                                       (7) 
 
Equation (6) can be computed in two different ways, either using tier 1 data (i.e.,     
K = tier 1 capital and CAR = tier 1 ratio) or using total capital data (i.e., K = total 
capital and CAR = total capital ratio). Obviously, both methods yield the same value 
for risk-weighted assets. In order to check for consistency of the results, I computed the 
                                                           
4 Data on capital adequacy are not available for years prior to 1988, preventing any comparison 
with the pre-Basel period. The choice of 1995 is somewhat arbitrary but quite standard given that 
most studies on the impact of the Basel Accord focus on the first half of the 1990s. In the case of 
the US, Flannery and Rangan (2002) have shown that none of the 100 largest banking firms 
appears to have been constrained by regulatory capital requirements since 1995.    10
credit risk ratio using both methods except for Japanese banks, which generally do not 
report their total capital. 
 
3.2   Descriptive statistics 
 
Using the data from Bankscope, I constructed an unbalanced panel containing 576 
commercial banks from six G-10 countries with assets of more than $100 million during 
the period 1988-95. Banks that did not report their total capital ratio, their tier 1 ratio 
or their credit risk ratio for at least 2 consecutive years were omitted from the data set. 
Also, banks with a capital ratio above 50% or a credit risk ratio above 200% were 
treated as outliers and excluded from the sample.  
The second column of Table 2 shows the distribution of banks by country. 
Unfortunately, Bankscope does not contain data on the capital levels of Belgian, Dutch, 
Luxembourg, German and Swiss commercial banks over the period of interest, which 
prevents the computation of their risk-weighted assets using equation (6). This explains 
why the analysis is limited to the remaining six G-10 countries.
5 Unsurprisingly, US and 
Japanese banking institutions constitute the vast majority of the sample banks. The 
remainder of Table 2 indicates that the sample is quite representative of each national 
banking sector. With the exception of the UK, the data set includes at least 7 of the 10 
biggest commercial banks (in terms of assets) of each country. Moreover, the sum of the 
sample banks’ assets almost always exceeds half of the total national banking assets. 
Tables 3A to 3C show the average total capital to assets ratio, tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio and credit risk ratio of each country between 1988 and 1995. The comparability of 
the figures displayed in the tables is not guaranteed since the number of observations is 
increasing over time.
6 Nevertheless, some tentative remarks can be made. First, looking 
at Tables 3A and 3B, the total capital to assets ratio and the tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio of each country are upward trending across the period surveyed. Two groups of 
countries coexist in the sample: those with relatively low capital to assets ratios 
throughout the whole period (France, Italy and Japan) and those that exhibit
                                                           
5 Data were also available for Sweden but this country was excluded from the sample because of 
the banking crisis of the early 1990s.  
6 G-10 banks started to implement the Basel standards only gradually, which explains the low 
number of observations at the end of the 1980s. The slightly lower number of banks in 1994 and 
1995 is due to a few mergers, which were not motivated by the level of capitalization of merging 
banks.       11
higher values for both capital ratios (Canada, the UK and the US). Second, looking at 
Table 3C, some countries (Canada, the UK and possibly the US) appear to have 
experienced a decrease in credit risk whereas others (France, Italy and Japan) have seen 
credit risk remaining relatively constant. Once again, the sample can be divided into two 
groups of countries: those with an average credit risk ratio varying between 50% and 
60% (France, Italy and perhaps the UK) and those with a credit risk ratio equal to or 
higher than 70% (Canada, Japan and the US). At first glance, it might be tempting to 
attribute the higher credit risk ratio of these three countries to their pre-1988 capital 
adequacy rules. Indeed, until the Basel guidelines were adopted, simple gearing ratios 
were in force in Canada, Japan and the US (Pecchioli, 1987), which may account for 
their historically higher level of credit risk. But then, the 1988 Accord should have led to 
a decrease in the credit risk ratio of these countries as risk-based standards take into 
account the composition of banks’ portfolio when assessing capital charges. However, 
Table 3C provides mixed support for this hypothesis: Canadian banks did indeed 
experience a decrease in credit risk whereas the level of risk-taking of Japanese 
institutions remained fairly constant. The increasing number of observations for US 
banks prevents any reliable comparison. Overall, Tables 3A to 3C suggest that the six 
G-10 countries have raised their capital to assets ratios (K/A) during the 1988-95 period 
whereas no specific trend could be found in the credit risk ratio (RWA/A).  
Table 3 (Panels D and E) and Table 4 report additional descriptive statistics on the 
relationship between capital and risk. Tables 3D and 3E show the total capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio and the tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of each country, 
respectively. Both series are upward trending across the years 1988-93 with no significant 
increase afterwards. On average, banks from all countries except Canada and France 
already met the minimum requirements of 8% for the total capital ratio and 4% for the 
tier 1 ratio in 1989. This result is consistent with the idea that banks tend to be well 
above the minimum requirements for precautionary and/or reputational reasons.
7     
Table 4 further decomposes the average annual growth rate of both capital adequacy 
ratios into three terms, as in equation (5). As can be seen from the table, the growth 
rate of both ratios over the sample years is roughly similar and is mainly driven by a rise 
in capital levels, which offsets the rise in total assets. The growth rate of the credit risk 
ratio is close to zero for all countries except for Canada and the UK, where it is negative.  
                                                           
7 See Bauman and Nier (2003) and Lindquist (2004) for an investigation of the determinants of 
banks’ capital buffers in the UK and in Norway, respectively.      12
However, Tables 3 and 4 do not tell us whether ∆(K/A) and ∆(RWA/A) are related, 
nor whether the increase in capital to assets ratios that took place between 1988 and 
1995 was due to the introduction of capital adequacy rules. Indeed, it could be the case 
that banks that were not part of the Basel Accord also decreased their leverage. Figure 1 
shows for instance that a rise in the equity to assets ratio
8 was not only experienced by 
G-10 banks at the beginning of the 1990s, but also by non G-10 banks and even by 
banks from countries where capital adequacy rules were not put in place before 1993.
9 In 
a similar way, Figure 2 indicates that the reliance of these three groups of banks on 
subordinated debt
10 — a key component of tier 2 capital — was roughly similar throughout 
the period surveyed. Thus, determining whether the Basel agreement caused changes in 
the capital to assets ratio (K/A) and the credit risk ratio (RWA/A) of G-10 banks and 
whether these changes were related requires a more complex econometric analysis than 
just looking at descriptive statistics. The following section sets up a model that aims at 
assessing the empirical determinants of observed changes in capital and risk with a 
particular emphasis on the role played by regulatory pressure.   
 
 
4 Econometric  framework  
 
4.1   The model 
 
In order to acknowledge that capital and risk decisions are determined together, I 
extend the simultaneous equation model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to a 
multi-country setting. In this model, observed changes in banks’ capital and risk-taking 
consist of two components, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by factors 
exogenous to the bank: 
 
                                                           
8 The equity to assets ratio is an approximation of the tier 1 capital to assets ratio as its 
numerator does not include disclosed reserves. 
9 The use of this third group of banks is motivated by the fact that a large number of non G-10 
countries adopted Basel-like rules between 1988 and 1993. I consider that a country has not 
implemented the Basel Accord before 1993 if its banks did not report a capital adequacy ratio 
before that year. 
10 Note that Figure 2 does not distinguish between subordinated debt with a term to maturity of 
less or more than five years. Only the latter category is allowed to count as tier 2 capital, along 
with other elements (cf. section 2.2).   13
d
i,t i,t i,t CAP CAP =+ E ∆∆   (8)
d
i,t i,t i,t RISK RISK =+ S ∆∆   (9)
 
where  ∆CAPi,t and ∆RISKi,t are the observed changes in capital and risk levels, 
respectively, for bank i in period t. The ∆
dCAPi,t and ∆
dRISKi,t variables represent 
discretionary adjustments in capital and risk while Ei,t and Si,t are exogenously-
determined factors. 
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), I model the discretionary changes in capital and 
risk using a partial adjustment framework such that: 
 
d*
i,t i,t i,t-1 CAP CAP -CAP =( ) ∆ α  (10)
d*




i,t CAP  and 
*
i,t RISK  are bank i’s target capital and risk levels, respectively. 
Thus, the discretionary changes in capital and risk for bank i are proportional to the 
difference between the target level in period t and the observed level in period t-1. 
Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equations (8) and (9), the changes in 
capital and risk can be written as: 
 
*
i,t i,t i,t i,t-1 CAP CAP -CAP =( ) + E ∆ α  (12)
*
i,t i,t i,t i,t-1 RISK RISK -RISK =( ) + S ∆ β   (13)
 
This means that observed changes in capital and risk are a function of the target 
capital and risk levels, the lagged capital and risk levels, and any random shocks. In this 
paper, bank capital (CAP) is defined as the capital to assets ratio (K/A) — either the 
total capital to assets ratio or the tier 1 capital to assets ratio — while bank risk-taking 
(RISK) is defined as the credit risk ratio (RWA/A). As shown in equation (5), K/A and 
RWA/A represent the two variables that banks have at their discretion to adjust their 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR). It should be pointed out that alternative measures of risk-
taking such as value at risk or the volatility of the market price of banks’ assets were not   14
available for the sample banks over the period considered. Also, the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans was not considered as a potential measure of credit risk 
since there remains difficulties in obtaining data that are comparable across countries 
(Sudararajan et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the choice of RWA/A as a measure of risk-
taking can be criticized on the ground that the four risk buckets specified by the Basel 
Committee only imperfectly capture credit risk (see for instance Jones, 2000). Therefore, 
one may want to consider that RWA/A is more a measure of portfolio composition 
(“regulatory risk”) than of absolute credit risk (“economic risk”).
11 This interpretation is 
independent of whether RWA/A is correct measure of credit risk.       
Although the target capital and risk levels of a bank are not observable, they are 
assumed to depend on some set of observable variables describing the bank’s financial 
condition and the state of the economy in each country. The variables that I use to 
approximate the target capital to assets ratio (CAP*) are the size of the bank (SIZE), a 
measure of its liquidity (LOANS), a measure of its asset quality (LLOSS), a measure of 
its profitability (ROA), the rate of GDP growth (GROWTH), changes in the credit risk 
ratio (∆RISK), country dummies, the degree of regulatory pressure (REG) interacted 
with country dummies, and year dummies (YEAR). The variables used to proxy the 
target credit risk ratio (RISK*) are SIZE, LOANS, LLOSS, GROWTH, changes in the 
capital to assets ratio (∆CAP), country dummies, REG interacted with country 
dummies, and YEAR. The explanatory variables can thus be divided into bank-specific 
and country-specific factors plus year dummies (Table 2A in Appendix shows summary 
statistics for each variable). 
 
4.2   Bank-specific variables 
 
All the variables presented here have been used in the studies listed Table 1 with the 
exception of the LOANS variable. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. It 
is included as a control variable because large banks have an easier access to equity 
capital markets and are thus expected to have lower capital to assets ratios than smaller 
banks. In addition, large banks carry out a wider range of activities, which should 
increase their ability to diversify their portfolio hence to decrease their credit risk. The 
variable LOANS, defined as the percentage of total assets tied up in loans, is included in 
                                                           
11 However, Avery and Berger (1991) find that US banks with higher RWA/A exhibit poorer 
performance thereby supporting the use of this variable as a risk measure.     15
the system of equations as a measure of the riskiness of the bank. As higher LOANS 
values correspond to lower investment in non earning assets, they should lead to higher 
portfolio risk and a greater need for capital. Loan loss provisions as a percentage of total 
assets, LLOSS, represent funds that banks set aside to cover bad loans. They are 
included in the capital equation because an increase in provisions may put capital under 
pressure if banks have not built up a sufficient equity buffer to cope with credit losses. 
Loan loss provisions are also included in the risk equation because they are deducted 
from outstanding loans and should therefore lead to a decrease in risk-weighted assets. 
Consistent with previous studies, the return on assets, ROA, is included in the capital 
equation as profitable banks may prefer to increase capital through retained earnings 
rather than through equity issues in the presence of asymmetric information in capital 
markets.  
Finally, the analysis in section 2 indicates that banks’ capital and risk choices are 
interdependent, which suggests the inclusion of ∆RISK in equation (12) and of ∆CAP in 
equation (13). Looking at equation (13), a positive and significant coefficient for ∆CAP 
would indicate that G-10 banks increased their capital to assets ratio and their credit 
risk ratio simultaneously - a result consistent with the unintended effects of more 
stringent capital requirements - while a negative and significant coefficient would 
indicate that higher capital to assets ratios give banks greater incentives to decrease 
credit risk. Section 5 also presents an alternative specification where I interact ∆CAP 
and ∆RISK with the regulatory pressure variable (cf. below) in order to see if banks with 
low capital buffers adjust their capital and risk differently from banks with high capital 
buffers.  
 
4.3   Country-specific variables 
 
Country fixed-effects are included in the model in order to account for factors that 
are not reflected by the set of bank-specific variables, such as national differences in 
capital preferences and risk-aversion. The country dummies are also assumed to capture 
the extent to which national variants of the Basel Accord had an impact on capital and 
risk. Some countries that were part of the 1988 agreement have indeed supplemented the 
original guidelines with additional requirements such as slightly different capital 
thresholds or new regulatory ratios over the period studied (e.g. FDICIA in the US). The 
rate of GDP growth (GROWTH) is included in the capital and the risk equations in   16
order to take account of country-specific macroeconomic shocks such as changes in the 
volume or in the structure of loans demand that can affect banks’ capital and risk-
taking. 
Of greater interest here is the regulatory pressure variable (REG), which is 
interacted with a second set of country dummies. This variable describes the behavior of 
banks that fell short of the minimum capital requirements. For these banks, not meeting 
the Basel standards was potentially life threatening as it meant exclusion from 
international business. Thus, undercapitalized institutions should have increased their 
capital to assets ratio and/or decreased their credit risk more than well-capitalized 
institutions if the 1988 Basel Accord was effective in leveling the playing field for G-10 
banks. Consistent with most of the studies in Table 1, regulatory pressure is measured 
by a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if the capital adequacy ratio falls 
below the Basel minimum requirement plus one bank-specific standard deviation and 
zero otherwise. The rationale for this definition of regulatory pressure is that banks 
generally build a buffer above the regulatory minimum for precautionary and/or 
reputational reasons and that this buffer depends on the volatility of their own capital 
adequacy ratio. Although the choice of one standard deviation is somehow arbitrary, 
Table 5 (Panel A) shows that it produces sensible percentages of banks experiencing 
regulatory pressure in each country (from now on, I use the term “undercapitalized” to 
describe these bank observations). On average, 17.1% of the bank observations fall below 
the minimum requirements plus one standard deviation when looking at the total capital 
ratio and 4.8% when considering the tier 1 ratio. Table 5 (Panel B) further indicates 
that the percentage of banks falling below the regulatory minimum - without any added 
standard deviation - was very low over the period surveyed. On average, only 4.2% of 
the sample banks fell in the undercapitalized category when looking at their total capital 
ratio and a mere 1.0% when considering their tier 1 ratio. Although this result seems to 
support the widespread idea that banks were not affected by the Basel standards, it 
could be the case that lower requirements would have induced banks to hold less capital 
and that banks actually constructed a buffer above the regulatory minimum. This 
motivates the addition of one standard deviation to the regulatory minimum. 
Nevertheless, the above definition of regulatory pressure has two shortcomings. First, 
the standard deviation of banks’ capital adequacy ratio may be large because banks are 
precisely increasing their capital adequacy ratio in order to meet the minimum 
requirements. This may lead to incorrectly classifying banks in the undercapitalized   17
category. As a sensitivity check, I used the standard deviation of several variables which 
are correlated with banks’ capital adequacy ratio (e.g. total assets, return on assets). The 
percentages of undercapitalized observations, which are not shown here, are relatively 
similar to those obtained when adding one standard deviation of banks’ capital adequacy 
ratio. A second shortcoming of the REG variable is that the behavior of banks falling 
below the regulatory minimum plus one standard deviation is likely to be influenced by 
other factors than regulatory pressure from prudential authorities including market 
pressure from peer banks, private investors or credit rating agencies. Thus, it may be 
hard to disentangle the effects of the Basel Accord from increased market discipline 
(Basel Committee, 1999). In order to mitigate this problem, section 5 presents an 
alternative specification where I use a dummy variable which is equal to unity if banks 
had a credit rating from Moody’s or S&P or were listed on a stock exchange over the 
period surveyed and zero otherwise. This variable is interacted with the regulatory 
pressure variable in order to capture the marginal effect that market discipline has on 
the relationships between REG and ∆CAP and REG and ∆RISK.  
 
4.4   Year dummy variables 
 
Dummy variables for each year of the reference period - except 1989 in order to 
avoid perfect collinearity - are added to the specification in order to take account of 
common country shocks that may have affected banks’ capital and credit risk (e.g. end 
of the implementation period of the Basel Accord in 1992).  
 
4.5   Empirical specification and estimation technique 
 
Based on the variables selected to explain target capital and risk levels, the model 
defined by equations (12) and (13) is written as follows: 
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t j,t i,t-1   01 2 34 5 CAP = SIZE + LOANS + LLOSS + ROA + GROWTH + CAP aa a aa a ∆
t
i,t i,t-1 t i,t
jj
67 j j 8 j j 9 t +R I S K + + R E G + Y E A R + aa c a c a E ∆ ∑∑ ∑                                (14) 
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t j,t i,t-1 i,t 01 2 3 4 5 RISK =b SIZE +b LOANS +b LLOSS + GROWTH +b RISK +b CAP b ∆ ∆
i,t-1 t i,t
jj t
6j j 7j j 8t +b c +b c R E G+b + YEAR S ∑∑ ∑                                               (15)    18
where cj is country dummy variable (1 if bank i belongs to country j, 0 otherwise) 
  j is a country index and t is a time index (t= 1990,...1995) 
  Ei,t and Si,t are disturbance terms such that Ei,t = µi + εi,t and Si,t = ηi + νi,t 
with  µi  ∼  IID(0,
2
µ σ ),  ηi  ∼  IID(0,
2
η σ ),  εi,t  ∼  IID(0,
2
ε σ ) and νi,t  ∼  IID(0,
2
ν σ ) 
independent from each other 
 
The coefficients of particular interest in this system of equations are a8j and b7j, 
which represent, for country j, the impact of regulatory pressure on observed changes in 
capital and risk, respectively, and a6 and b5 that test the overall relationship between 
changes in capital and risk. 
Since the sample consists of 576 banks distributed over six countries, the most 
efficient way to estimate equations (14) and (15) is to use a methodology which accounts 
for the clustering of banks within countries. This type of model is usually called a 
multilevel or hierarchical model (Wooldridge, 2002). More precisely, I estimated a 
country fixed-effect and bank random-effect model (cj being the country fixed-effect and 
µi and ηi being the bank random-effects) and I used a likelihood ratio test for comparing 
this model to ordinary least squares. The small chi2 values of the likelihood ratio test 
rejected the presence of random effects in the ∆CAP and ∆RISK equations. This means 
that the gain in efficiency of the multilevel model is limited and that there is no 
objection to pooling the data and using ordinary least squares with country-specific fixed 
effects. However, since the right-hand side of both ∆CAP and ∆RISK includes an 
endogenous variable, the estimation of the system formed by equations (14) and (15) is 
carried out by three stage least squares (3SLS) in order to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates. In addition, 3SLS is more efficient than two stage least squares (2SLS) as it 
exploits error correlation across equations.
12 
Given that US and Japanese banks represent the vast majority of banks in my 
sample, I also performed a poolability test which rejected the equality of the coefficients 
of the year dummies and of the control variables in the US, Japanese and non-US/non-
Japanese groups. The system formed by equations (14) and (15) is therefore estimated 
separately for three groups of banks: Canadian, French, Italian and UK banks (Table 
6A), Japanese banks (Table 6B) and US banks (Table 6C). In the case of US and 
Japanese banks, the country dummies are replaced by a constant. 
                                                           
12 However, 3SLS may be sensitive to misspecification or measurement error. This suggests 
comparison with 2SLS estimates as a specification check. Estimation of equations (14) and (15) 
using 2SLS produces very similar results to 3SLS.   19
5 Results  
 
5.1   Baseline  specification 
 
Tables 6A to 6C show the results of the system described by equations (14) and (15). 
The variable CAP is defined as the total capital to assets ratio in the first two columns 
of each table and as the tier 1 capital to assets ratio in the remaining two columns. 
I start by presenting the results for Canada, France, Italy and the UK (Table 6A). 
The time dummies in the ∆CAP equations are all insignificant, which suggests that 
target capital levels were relatively constant across years once controlling for other 
determinants of capital to assets ratios. The time dummies in the ∆RISK equations are 
significantly negative for the years 1991-95 when CAP is defined as the total capital to 
assets ratio and for the years 1990 and 1992-1995 when CAP is defined as the tier 1 
capital to assets ratio.
13 This result provides evidence that banks in Canada, France, 
Italy and the UK lowered credit risk at the beginning of the 1990s, ceteris paribus. Next, 
the country dummy variables, used alone, reflect the expected change in capital and risk 
for the respective countries over 1988-95. The country dummies in the ∆CAP and ∆RISK 
equations are significant in France and Italy.
14 Their magnitude is roughly identical in 
the capital equations (+1.6 percentage points when CAP is defined as the total capital 
to assets ratio and +1.5 percentage points when CAP is defined as the tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio) and in the risk equations (+8.5 percentage points), suggesting that banks in 
these two countries experienced a similar increase in capital and risk over the period 
surveyed. Looking at Table 6B, the constant and the country dummies are negative and 
significant in the risk equation, indicating that Japanese banks decreased their credit risk 
at the beginning of the 1990s and that target risk ratios were below those of the 
excluded year, ceteris paribus.
15 The constant and the year dummies are not significant 
in Table 6C.  
                                                           
13 An F-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the time dummies are 
equal for these years (the test statistic is 5.46 with associated probability of 0.25 in the first 
system of equations and 7.34 with associated probability of 0.12 in the second system of 
equations).  
14 The country dummies for Canada and the UK are only marginally significant in the capital 
and/or risk equations. 
15 In the case of Japanese banks, I always focus on the system of equations where CAP is defined 
as the tier 1 capital to assets ratio since the first system is only based on 48 observations.   20
Before analyzing the regulatory pressure brought about by the Basel Accord and the 
overall relationship between capital and risk, I briefly discuss the sign of the remaining 
control variables (lower panel of Tables 6A to 6C). The parameter estimates on lagged 
capital and risk are negative and significant, with values lying in the ranges [-0.185;       
-0.135] in Table 6A, [-0.139; -0.079] in Table 6B and [-0.174; -0.161] in Table 6C. These 
figures indicate that G-10 banks were adjusting their capital and risk to desired levels 
relatively rapidly in the first half of the 1990s. Typically, shocks to capital and risk were 
halved within 3 and 5 years for Canadian, French, Italian and UK banks, within 4 and 9 
years for Japanese banks and within 3 and 4 years for US banks. Other control variables 
display various levels of significance in Tables 6A to 6C. Bank size (SIZE) has generally 
a negative and significant effect on capital to assets ratios and a positive and significant 
effect on credit risk ratios. Possible interpretations are that large banks have easier 
access to capital markets and can therefore operate with lower amounts of capital or that 
they feel less pressure to increase their capital to assets ratio because of a “too-big-to-
fail” effect. A larger size also allows a greater diversification to mitigate the credit risk 
exposure. As hypothesized, loans as a percentage of total assets (LOANS) are a good 
proxy of the target risk profile of a bank as they always increase the credit risk ratio 
significantly. However, their impact on capital to assets ratios is not always significant. 
The return on assets (ROA) has a positive and significant effect on banks’ capital to 
assets ratios, a result consistent with the hypothesis that banks with higher earnings can 
retain more capital. Loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets (LLOSS) have no 
effect on target capital and risk levels overall, while GDP growth (GROWTH) has a 
positive and significant effect on the credit risk ratio of Canadian, French, Italian and 
UK banks and a negative and significant effect on the tier 1 capital to assets ratio of 
Japanese banks. More importantly, Tables 6A to 6C provide some insights on the 
behavior of banks experiencing regulatory pressure and on the overall relationship 
between ∆CAP and ∆RISK.  
 
Impact of the Basel Accord on bank capital and credit risk-taking 
 
In this study, the impact of the Basel Accord on bank capital and credit risk is 
measured trough a dummy variable which is equal to unity if the capital adequacy ratio 
falls below the minimum requirement plus one bank-specific standard deviation and zero 
otherwise. If regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards was   21
effective, undercapitalized banks should have increased their capital to assets ratio 
and/or decreased their credit risk ratio more than adequately capitalized banks. Looking 
at the behavior of undercapitalized institutions in Tables 6A to 6C, two groups of 
countries can be distinguished: (1) France and Italy and (2) Canada, Japan, the UK and 
the US. 
In France and Italy, undercapitalized banks did not behave significantly differently 
from adequately capitalized banks. That is, the regulatory pressure variable interacted 
with the country dummies is insignificant, both in the ∆CAP and ∆RISK equations. The 
results for France are not surprising given that some undercapitalized banks (e.g. Crédit 
Lyonnais) were still state-owned at the beginning of the 1990s and thus found it difficult 
to increase shareholders’ equity. In the case of Italy, some troubled banking institutions 
(e.g. Banco di Napoli) not only fell below the regulatory threshold but also saw their 
capital position deteriorate over the period studied, which explains why regulatory 
pressure has no impact on banks’ capital to assets ratio. The insignificance of the 
regulatory pressure variable in the risk equations further indicates that undercapitalized 
banks in France and Italy did not increase or decrease the riskiness of their portfolio 
compared to other banks. These results represent new evidence on the impact of the 
1988 capital standards.     
In the remaining four countries (Canada, Japan, the UK and the US), the regulatory 
pressure variable had a positive and significant impact on the tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio and/or the total capital to assets ratio but no significant impact on the credit risk 
ratio.  Ceteris paribus, Canadian banks close to the legal minimum requirements 
increased their total capital to assets ratio by 0.8 percentage points more than other 
Canadian banks, while UK banks below the minimum requirements plus one standard 
deviation increased their total capital to assets ratio by 0.9 percentage points more than 
other UK banks (the latter result is only marginally significant). These findings are 
consistent with Illing and Paulin (2004) who provide informal evidence showing that the 
1988 standards had a positive effect on Canadian banks’ capital adequacy ratios, and 
with Ediz et al. (1998) who found that UK banks responded to the Basel requirements 
by raising additional capital without relying significantly on substitution away from high 
risk-weight assets. The latter paper also finds that UK banks below the minimum 
requirements plus one standard deviation increased their total capital adequacy ratio by 
0.4 percentage point per quarter, an adjustment which is higher than the one suggested 
by the coefficient of REG*UK in Table 6A (0.9 percentage points on an annual basis).     22
Looking at Table 6B, we see that Japanese banks falling below the minimum legal 
requirements plus one standard deviation increased their tier 1 capital to assets ratio by 
only 0.3 percentage points more than other Japanese banks, ceteris paribus. It is well-
known that one of the goals of the 1988 Basel Accord was to create a level playing field 
by eliminating the funding-cost advantage enjoyed by Japanese banks which operated 
with significantly lower capital ratios compared to their competitors in other G-10 
countries (Wagster, 1996). The size of the coefficient of the REG variable tends to 
indicate that only part of this competitive advantage was reduced following the 
introduction of the Basel guidelines. The results for Japan contrast with Ito and Sasaki 
(1998) and Montgomery (2005) who show that undercapitalized Japanese banks tended 
to issue more subordinated debt (an increase in tier 2 capital, hence in total capital) 
while leaving their tier 1 capital relatively unchanged. A possible explanation is that 
both papers focus on slightly different time periods (1990-92 for the first study and 1988-
99 for the second study). Montgomery (2005) also finds that banks with relatively low 
tier 1 capital ratios tended to shift their asset portfolio out of heavily-weighted risky 
assets such as corporate bonds and into zero-weighted riskless assets such as government 
bonds. This effect is not observed here, probably because RWA/A is a broader measure 
of credit risk. 
Looking at Table 6C, we observe that undercapitalized US banks increased their 
total capital to assets ratio by 0.9 percentage points and their tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio by 1.5 percentage points more than other US banks, ceteris paribus. This finding is 
consistent with Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) who focus on the 1990-96 period, although 
their estimates of the impact of regulatory pressure on banks’ capital are about twice as 
high as those presented in this paper. A possible explanation is that the authors use a 
different definition of the REG variable.   
The results so far indicate that Canadian, Japanese, UK and US banks below the 
minimum requirements plus one standard deviation improved their tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio and/or their total capital to assets ratio in order to avoid the penalties 
implied by a breach of the Basel guidelines. The impact of regulatory pressure was the 
largest for US banks (1.5 percentage points per annum for the tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio) and the smallest for Japanese banks (0.3 percentage points per annum for the tier 
1 capital to assets ratio). However, regulatory pressure did not have any impact on the 
capital to assets ratios of French and Italian banks. Also, there is no evidence that   23
undercapitalized G-10 banks increased or decreased their portfolio risk over the period 
surveyed.   
  
Overall relationship between changes in capital and credit risk  
 
With respect to the overall relationship between ∆CAP and ∆RISK, the results in 
Table 6A show that changes in capital and credit risk were not related in Canada, 
France, Italy and the UK over the 1988-95 period. The results in Tables 6B and 6C are 
different in comparison. Changes in capital and credit risk were positively related for 
Japanese banks and negatively related for US banks at the beginning of the 1990s.  
In the case of Japanese banks, an increase of 1 percentage point in the tier 1 capital 
to assets ratio increased the credit risk ratio by about 1.6 percentage points while a 
similar increase in the credit risk ratio had only a very small, though significant, effect 
on tier 1 capital. Thus, Japanese banks appear to have raised their capital and risk 
simultaneously, a result consistent with Koehn and Santomero (1980) who argue that 
more stringent capital regulation will cause a utility maximizing bank to increase asset 
risk. This finding may also be explained by various theories providing a rationale for a 
positive relationship between changes in capital and risk, including the “bankruptcy cost 
avoidance” theory and the “managerial risk aversion” theory (see Shrieves and Dahl, 
1992). In the case of US banks, an increase of 1 percentage point in both capital to assets 
ratios decreased the credit risk ratio by about 1.5 percentage points whereas a similar 
increase in the credit risk ratio had only a very small, though significant, effect on both 
capital to assets ratios. The negative association between changes in capital and risk 
might be due to subsidized deposit insurance, which gives value-maximizing banks an 
incentive to increase both portfolio risk and leverage risk.  
 
5.2   Alternative specification 
 
Tables 7A to 7C present an alternative specification where regulatory pressure is 
interacted with a variable capturing whether banks experience some market pressure or 
not. This variable (MARKET) is a dummy which is equal to unity if banks had a credit 
rating from Moody’s or S&P or were listed on a stock exchange over the period surveyed 
and zero otherwise. The aim is to capture the marginal effect that market pressure has 
on the relationships between REG and ∆CAP and REG and ∆RISK. More precisely, the   24
specification in Tables 7A to 7C includes three interaction terms between REG (or 1-
REG) and MARKET (or 1-MARKET), whose effect must be interpreted with respect to 
the omitted category of banks (for ease of interpretation, REG is not interacted with 
country dummies in Table 7A). For instance, the coefficient of REG*(1-MARKET) 
indicates by how much banks which experience regulatory pressure but no market 
pressure modify their capital and risk levels compared to banks which do not experience 
either form of pressure. In addition, the specification in Tables 7A to 7C interacts ∆CAP 
and ∆RISK with REG in order to investigate whether banks with low capital buffers 
adjust their capital and risk differently from banks with high capital buffers (Heid et al., 
2004).  
Since most of the control variables in Tables 7A to 7C display the same sign and 
level of significance as in Tables 6A to 6C, I focus on the variables of interests i.e. the 
variables interacted with the REG dummy. I start by presenting the results for 
Canadian, French, Italian and UK banks. Looking at Table 7A, the coefficients of 
REG*(1-MARKET), REG*MARKET and (1-REG)*MARKET are insignificant, which 
implies that banks which experienced regulatory and/or market pressure in these four 
countries did not behave significantly differently from banks which did not experience 
either form of pressure. The results in Table 7B are quite different. The coefficient of 
REG*(1-MARKET) is positive and significant in the capital equation but insignificant in 
the risk equation. Ceteris paribus, Japanese banks which experienced regulatory pressure 
but no market pressure increased their tier 1 capital to assets ratio by 0.4 percentage 
points more than Japanese banks which did not experience either form of pressure. This 
estimate represents the true impact of regulatory pressure since it does not include the 
contribution of market pressure. Interestingly, the coefficient of REG*MARKET is also 
positive and significant in the capital equation and insignificant the risk equation. 
Ceteris paribus, Japanese banks which experienced both regulatory and market pressures 
increased their tier 1 ratio by 0.2 percentage points more than Japanese banks which did 
not experience either form of pressure. An F-test further rejects the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of REG*(1-MARKET) and REG*MARKET are equal in the capital 
equation,
16 meaning that the marginal impact of market pressure on the relationship 
between REG and ∆CAP is negative and significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of (1-
REG)*MARKET is negative and significant in the capital equation, implying that 
                                                           
16 The test statistic is 7.42 with associated probability of.0.01.   25
Japanese banks which experienced market pressure but no regulatory pressure lowered 
their tier 1 capital ratio compared to Japanese banks which did not feel either form of 
pressure. However, the size of the effect is very small (less than 0.05 percentage points). 
Looking at Table 7C, the coefficient of REG*(1-MARKET) is positive and significant 
in the capital equations but insignificant in the risk equations. Ceteris paribus, US banks 
which experienced regulatory pressure but no market pressure increased their total 
capital to assets ratio by 0.6 percentage points and their tier 1 capital to assets ratio by 
1.2 percentage points more than US banks which did not experience either form of 
pressure. The coefficient of REG*MARKET is positive and significant in the capital 
equation and in the risk equation (but only when CAP is defined as the total capital to 
assets ratio). Ceteris paribus, US banks which experienced both regulatory and market 
pressures increased their total capital to assets ratio by 1.0 percentage points and their 
credit risk ratio by 2.7 percentage points more than US banks which did not experience 
either form of pressure. An F-test further fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of REG*(1-MARKET) and REG*MARKET are equal in the capital equation 
where CAP is defined as the total capital to assets ratio,
17 meaning that the marginal 
impact of market pressure on the relationship between REG and ∆CAP is not 
statistically different from zero. Finally, the coefficient of (1-REG)*MARKET is negative 
and significant in the risk equation where CAP is defined as the tier 1 capital to assets 
ratio, implying that US banks which experienced market pressure but no regulatory 
pressure somehow lowered their risk-taking compared to US banks which did not feel 
either form of pressure. 
To sum up, the results show that regulatory pressure was effective in raising the   
tier 1 capital to assets ratio and/or the total capital to assets ratio of US and Japanese 
banks, while preventing them from shifting their portfolio towards riskier assets. This 
increase in capital to assets ratios reflects the true effect of the Basel standards since the 
marginal contribution of market pressure in the capital equations is either insignificant 
or negative. In addition, market pressure appears to have increased the risk-taking of US 
banks that were undercapitalized but to have lowered the risk-taking of US banks that 
were adequately capitalized.    
With respect to the overall relationship between capital and risk, the results in the 
lower panel of Tables 7A to 7C only weakly support the hypothesis that undercapitalized  
                                                           
17 The test statistic is 1.87 with associated probability of.0.17.   26
banks adjusted their capital and risk differently from well-capitalized banks. In Table 
7A, the relationship between capital and risk is mostly insignificant except in the second 
system of equations, where it is insignificant for well-capitalized banks and negative and 
significant for undercapitalized banks. In Table 7B, the coefficients of ∆CAP and ∆RISK 
are positive and significant but the coefficients of these two variables interacted with 
REG are insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between capital and risk was not 
different for undercapitalized and well-capitalized Japanese banks. Finally, in Table 7C, 
the coefficients of ∆CAP, ∆RISK and of these two variables interacted with REG are 
generally negative and significant, indicating that the relationship between capital and 
risk was negative both for undercapitalized and well-capitalized US banks. However, the 
relationship between capital and risk was comparatively more negative for 
undercapitalized US banks, probably because these banks tried to increase their capital 
to risk-weighted assets ratios more strongly than well-capitalized banks. Thus, the 
findings at the bottom of Tables 7A to 7C contrast with Heid et al. (2004), who find a 
positive relationship between ∆CAP and ∆RISK for well-capitalized banks and a 
negative relationship between these two variables for undercapitalized banks in 
Germany.    
 
 
6 Conclusion   
 
This paper documents the behavior of banks from six G-10 countries toward capital 
and risk between 1988 and 1995 by using a modified version of the model developed by 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992). Prior research, both at the theoretical and empirical levels, 
indicates that banks may well respond to an increase in capital requirements by a 
corresponding increase in the credit risk of their portfolio. 
The evidence presented here shows that the impact of the 1988 Basel standards was 
not uniform across countries. In Canada, Japan, the UK and the US, banks within one 
standard deviation of the minimum regulatory capital requirement improved their tier 1 
capital to assets ratio and/or their total capital to assets ratios in order to comply with 
the new capital adequacy rules. However, regulatory pressure had no impact on the 
capital to assets ratios of French and Italian banks. The results also show that G-10 
banks experiencing regulatory pressure did not modify their credit risk exposure, which 
suggests that banks that had to raise their capital adequacy ratios drastically did not   27
substitute away from riskier assets or engage in riskier activities. Interestingly, the above 
findings are robust to the inclusion of a variable which measures the marginal 
contribution that market pressure had on banks’ capital and risk levels. Thus, it is 
regulatory pressure - i.e. the extent to which prudential authorities threaten to or 
actually impede banks’ operations - and not market discipline which was effective in 
raising banks’ capital buffers across the G-10. In addition, changes in capital and risk 
were unrelated for Canadian, French, Italian and UK banks, positively related for 
Japanese banks and negatively related for US banks over the 1988-95 period. These 
results hold both for adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks.   
All in all, the evidence presented here indicates that the 1988 Basel Accord was 
generally effective in increasing capital buffers and preventing banks from engaging in 
riskier activities. These findings have important policy implications for regulators as they 
suggest that the use of risk buckets to assess and limit credit risk-taking is likely to 
produce the desired effect. This framework is currently being refined under the 
standardized approach to credit risk in the New Basel Accord.
18 This approach is likely 
to be adopted by many G-10 banks which do not have the resources to use one of the 
more advanced internal ratings-based approaches (Basel Committee, 2004).       
Three caveats are in order, however. First, as pointed out earlier, results for US 
banks should be interpreted with care given that the implementation of the second stage 
of the Basel Accord coincides with the passage of FDICIA. Thus, it is difficult to assess 
the impact of the Basel standards in the US and the regulatory pressure variable used in 
this study should be interpreted as reflecting the effect of capital regulation in a broad 
sense. Second, banks may have attempted to arbitrage between economic capital and 
regulatory capital by either boosting capital ratios through cosmetic arrangements or by 
exploiting shortcomings in the measure of credit risk. Although the lack of data prevents 
measuring the extent to which these techniques were used by banks in the 1990s (Basel 
Committee, 1999), one should be aware that observed changes in capital and risk may 
only partially reflect actual changes in capital and risk. Third, the paper analyzes credit 
risk in isolation from other types of risks, like market risk or interest rate risk. It could 
be that undercapitalized banks chose not to modify their portfolio risk in order to 
                                                           
18 Under the standardized approach to credit risk, wholesale exposures are assigned to five risk 
buckets (from 0% to 150%) according to the nature of the claim and the assessment of external 
agencies, while retail exposures receive a 75% risk weight. The internal ratings-based approaches 
allow banks to determine their own risk weights through the combination of their quantitative 
inputs and formulas specified by the Basel Committee.   28
comply with the Basel guidelines, but increased their interest or market exposure. 
However, evidence on the existence of such a trade-off is scarce.
19 Moreover, the fact that 
credit risk is still the biggest risk faced by banks strengthens confidence in the conclusion 














                                                           
19 This is mainly due to a lack of data. Typically, estimating interest-risk exposure requires data 
on the duration of banks’ assets. This information is almost impossible to obtain on a 
standardized cross-country basis. In the case of the US, Allen et al. (1996) provide some evidence 
that substitution of unpriced interest rate risk for priced credit risk did occur. However, they do 
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Table 1: Previous studies on the impact of capital adequacy regulation on bank 
capitalization and credit risk-taking 
Author(s)    
(Year of 
Publication) 















2,570 US commercial banks 
with assets > $100 million 
over 2 years (1990-91) — First 
step in the implementation 
process  
 
+ for A 
0 / — for U 
— for A 





2,849 US commercial banks 
with assets > $100 million 
over 3 years (1991-93) — 
Second step in the 
implementation process  
 
+ for A in 
93 
+ for U 
+ in 91 / — 
in 92-93 for 
A and U 
— in 91-92 / 
+ in 93 
Ediz et al. 
(1998) 
 
94 UK banks over 25 
quarters (4
th quarter 1989 - 
4
th quarter 1995) 
 
+ for U  0 for U  not studied 
Rime (2001)  154 Swiss banks over 7 years 
(1989-95) 
 
0 for A 
+ for U 
0 for A and 
U 




1,685 US commercial banks 
with assets > $100 million 
over 6 years (1991-96)  
 
+ for A and 
U  
+ in 91 / 0 
in 92 / — in 
93-96 for A 
and U 
 
+ and — in 
91-92 / + in 
93-96 
Heid et al. 
(2004) 
570 local German savings 
banks over 8 years (1993-
2000) 
 
Mostly 0  Mostly 0  + for A 
— for U 
Note:  +: significantly positive; —: significantly negative; 0: insignificant. 




Table 2: Representativeness of the sample 
Country  Number of banks 
Number of banks 
from the national 
top-10 
a 
Sample bank assets  
/ Total national 
banking assets 
a 
Canada 7   7   0.92   
France 9   7   0.49   
Italy 16   9   0.74   
Japan 76   9   0.84   
United Kingdom  9   6   0.70   
United States  459   10   0.91   
Note: 
a As of December 1995               33
Table 3A: Total capital to assets ratio (K/A) in % — number of observations in parenthesis  
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Canada  6.94 (6)    7.02 (7)    7.03 (7)    7.38 (7)    7.19 (7)    7.35 (7)    7.11 (7)    6.05 (7) 
France  4.27 (1)    3.93 (5)    4.24 (8)    4.58 (9)    4.76 (9)    5.03 (9)    5.25 (7)    5.10 (7) 
Italy  -    5.65 (1)    5.79 (2)    5.79 (6)    5.63 (10)    5.58 (14)    6.28 (16)    6.36 (14) 
Japan  -  -    6.58 (5)    6.08 (11)    7.02 (11)    7.12 (11)    6.60 (11)    6.65 (11) 
United Kingdom  8.90 (1)    8.01 (5)    8.70 (6)    8.73 (7)    7.98 (8)    8.43 (8)    8.43 (9)    8.20 (9) 
United States  -    8.54 (1)    7.49 (157)    7.71 (157)    8.35 (453)    8.83 (457)    8.76 (430)    9.25 (399) 
All countries  6.85 (8)    6.48 (19)    7.33 (185)    7.44 (197)    8.18 (498)    8.61 (506)    8.54 (480)    8.96 (447) 
 
Table 3B: Tier 1 capital to assets ratio (K/A) in % — number of observations in parenthesis  
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Canada     4.74 (6)     4.88 (7)    4.91 (7)    5.09 (7)    4.96 (7)    4.96 (7)    4.84 (7)    4.77 (7)  
France     2.29 (1)     2.72 (4)    2.51 (8)    2.62 (9)    2.86 (9)    2.94 (9)    3.04 (7)    3.06 (7)  
Italy  -    4.22 (1)    4.93 (2)    4.70 (6)    4.48 (9)    4.40 (14)     4.97 (16)    5.18 (13)  
Japan     3.25 (37)    3.62 (51)    3.78 (74)    3.84 (75)    4.08 (76)    4.13 (76)    4.20 (76)    4.11 (72) 
United Kingdom     4.89 (1)    4.69 (5)    5.11 (6)    5.31 (7)    4.59 (7)    5.17 (8)    5.42 (9)    5.32 (9) 
United States  -    5.07 (1)    5.54 (3)    6.35 (157)    7.14 (453)    7.57 (457)    7.40 (430)    7.81 (399) 
All countries     3.46 (45)    3.80 (69)    3.91 (100)    5.40 (261)    6.55 (561)    6.90 (571)    6.76 (545)    7.07 (507) 
 
Table 3C: Credit risk ratio (RWA/A) in % — number of observations in parenthesis  
 1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Canada  97.65 (6)    93.27 (7)   89.40 (7)   83.59 (7)   79.78 (7)   74.58 (7)    71.64 (7)    68.37 (7) 
France  71.70 (1)    55.59 (5)   58.57 (8)   58.82 (9)   58.64 (9)   57.16 (9)    54.59 (7)    53.06 (7) 
Italy          -    58.08 (1)   55.89 (2)   57.45 (6)   60.13 (9)   55.48 (14)    54.60 (16)    57.48 (13)  
Japan   66.78 (37)    68.45 (51)   67.81 (74)   68.23 (75)   69.78 (76)   68.72 (76)    68.36 (76)    67.95 (72) 
United Kingdom  75.17 (1)    79.33 (4)   76.30 (6)   74.02 (7)   65.62 (8)   65.00 (8)    62.72 (9)    61.57 (9) 
United States          -    92.12 (1)   85.80 (3)   78.96 (156)  69.96 (418)  69.30 (444)    70.89 (428)   72.93 (397)
All countries    71.19 (45)    70.86 (69)   69.39 (100)  74.66 (260)  69.64 (527)  68.68 (558)    69.72 (543)   71.28 (505)
 
   34
Table 3D: Total capital ratio (K/RWA) in % — number of observations in parenthesis 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Canada    7.14 (6)      7.59 (7)    7.89 (7)    8.86 (7)    9.01 (7)    9.84 (7)    9.94 (7)    9.91 (7) 
France    6.00 (1)      7.03 (7)    7.34 (9)    7.72 (9)    8.26 (9)    8.80 (9)    9.65 (9)    9.41 (9) 
Italy   10.02 (1)      8.84 (3)    8.97 (6)    9.75 (8)    9.32 (11)   10.15 (14)   11.69 (16)   11.33 (16) 
Japan    9.24 (37)      8.61 (51)    8.93 (74)    8.49 (75)    9.23 (76)    9.60 (76)    9.24 (76)    9.58 (72) 
United Kingdom   10.95 (2)      9.91 (6)   11.31 (7)   12.16 (7)   12.22 (9)   12.59 (9)   13.71 (9)   13.55 (9) 
United States  -      9.30 (1)    8.90 (3)   10.08 (156)   12.30 (418)   13.10 (444)   12.63 (429)   13.01 (399) 
All countries    8.99 (47)      8.49 (75)    8.88 (106)    9.56 (262)   11.68 (530)   12.43 (559)   12.06 (546)   12.38 (512) 
 
Table 3E: Tier 1 ratio (K/RWA) in % — number of observations in parenthesis 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Canada    4.84 (6)     5.33 (7)    5.54 (7)    6.07 (7)    6.23 (7)    6.67 (7)    6.76 (7)    6.97 (7) 
France    3.20 (1)     4.34 (5)    4.41 (8)    4.58 (8)    5.11 (8)    5.41 (8)    5.95 (8)    5.89 (8) 
Italy    8.88 (1)     7.31 (3)    7.76 (4)    7.85 (8)    7.37 (10)    8.00 (14)    9.28 (16)    8.96 (14) 
Japan    4.91 (37)     5.30 (51)    5.61 (74)    5.66 (75)    5.89 (76)    6.07 (76)    6.21 (76)    6.12 (72) 
United Kingdom    6.05 (2)     5.72 (6)    6.68 (7)    7.47 (7)    7.14 (8)    7.72 (9)    8.85 (9)    8.89 (9) 
United States          -     5.50 (1)    6.47 (3)    8.37 (156)   10.56 (418)   11.34 (444)   10.79 (429)   11.13 (399) 
All countries    5.00 (47)     5.36 (73)    5.69 (103)    7.37 (261)    9.63 (527)   10.34 (558)    9.95 (545)   10.19 (509) 
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Table 4: Decomposition of the average annual growth rate of CAR for the period 1988-95 (%)  
          

























  Number of 
observations
Canada  4.56        8.67     -4.23      8.33          48
France      4.55        7.76     -1.57      4.77          46
Italy     -1.68        1.92      0.75      2.85          45
Japan      1.55        5.02      0.32      3.15          49
United Kingdom      3.16        4.96     -4.04      5.85          43
United States      3.34       13.93      0.68      9.91      1,385
All countries  3.14       12.48        0.33        9.01      1,616  
        

























  Number of 
observations
Canada  4.56        8.67     -4.23      8.33          48
France  5.47        8.50     -2.00      5.03          40
Italy  -5.01       -1.40      0.75      2.85          45
Japan  2.24        9.32      0.26      6.82         461
United Kingdom  3.98        5.98     -3.91      5.90          42
United States  3.00       13.59      0.68      9.91      1,385
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Table 5: Percentage of observations with CAR < Threshold 
    
Panel A: Threshold = minimum capital requirements + one bank-specific standard deviation  
  CAR = Total capital ratio  CAR = Tier 1 capital ratio 
  Total obs.  Undercap. obs.  Total obs.  Undercap. obs. 
Canada       48  (100)        30 (62.5)       48 (100)          8  (16.7) 
France      53  (100)        38 (71.7)       46 (100)        18  (39.1) 
Italy      59  (100)        22 (37.3)       56 (100)          5  (8.9) 
Japan    465  (100)      146 (31.4)     465 (100)        37  (8.0) 
United Kingdom      49  (100)          4 (8.2)       48 (100)          4  (8.3) 
United State  1,451  (100)      123 (8.5)   1,451 (100)        30  (2.1) 
All countries  2,125   (100)     363 (17.08) 2,114 (100) 102  (4.82)
      
Panel B: Threshold = minimum capital requirements 
  CAR = Total capital ratio  CAR = Tier 1 capital ratio 
  Total obs.  Undercap. obs.  Total obs.  Undercap. obs. 
Canada       48  (100)       14 (29.2)       48 (100)         1  (2.1) 
France      53  (100)       19 (35.9)       46 (100)         6  (13.0) 
Italy      59  (100)         8 (13.6)       56 (100)         1  (1.8) 
Japan    465  (100)       31 (6.7)     465 (100)       12  (2.6) 
United Kingdom      49  (100)         1 (2.0)       48 (100)         0  (0.0) 
United State  1,451  (100)       17 (1.2)   1,451 (100)         2  (0.1) 
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Table 6A: Baseline specification (non-US and non-Japanese banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Year dummies  1990 -0.410 -2.977 -0.280  -3.161*
    (1.02) (1.62) (0.99) (1.69) 
  1991 0.081 -4.068** 0.014  -3.227
    (0.20) (2.15) (0.05) (1.59) 
  1992 -0.156 -5.650*** -0.305  -5.358***
    (0.39) (3.26) (1.05) (2.80) 
  1993 0.095 -5.866*** -0.156  -6.094***
    (0.23) (3.34) (0.52) (3.30) 
  1994 0.136 -7.552*** -0.062  -7.459***
    (0.30) (4.40) (0.19) (4.12) 
  1995 -0.257 -6.198*** -0.200  -6.435***
    (0.62) (3.43) (0.68) (3.42) 
Country dummies  Canada 0.539 4.860 1.187*  4.887
    (0.57) (1.17) (1.71) (1.07) 
  France 1.692* 9.205** 1.553**  8.516**
    (1.71) (2.37) (2.31) (2.04) 
  Italy 1.595* 8.645** 1.548**  8.400**
    (1.69) (2.35) (2.30) (2.08) 
  UK 1.296 6.330* 1.224*  6.357
    (1.38) (1.70) (1.86) (1.53) 
Regulatory pressure*  REG * Canada 0.781*** 0.013 0.234  1.878
Country dummies    (2.60) (0.01) (0.90) (1.00) 
  REG * France  -0.048 -2.088 0.016  -1.463
    (0.15) (1.59) (0.07) (1.02) 
  REG * Italy -0.266 -1.319 -0.428  1.433
    (0.92) (1.03) (1.21) (0.54) 
  REG * UK  0.898* -3.262 0.298  -2.811
    (1.92) (1.28) (0.88) (1.21) 
Control variables  SIZE -0.136** 0.033 -0.107**  0.032
    (2.23) (0.13) (2.33) (0.12) 
 LOANS  0.018* 0.159*** 0.007  0.157***
    (1.79) (4.51) (0.97) (4.23) 
 LLOSS  -0.117 -0.451 -0.098  -1.033
    (0.61) (0.58) (0.73) (1.24) 
 ROA  0.615*** 0.468*** 
    (3.50)  (3.24)  
 GROWTH  0.052 0.619** 0.035  0.770***
    (0.80) (2.38) (0.71) (2.88) 
 CAP(-1) -0.168*** -0.135*** 
    (2.87)  (3.02)  
  ∆RISK  -0.012 -0.020 
    (0.27)  (0.63)  
 RISK(-1) -0.185***   -0.185***
     (5.70)    (5.31) 
  ∆CAP  1.124  0.194
     (0.98)    (0.10) 
R-squared   0.258 0.530 0.149  0.476
Number of observations  179 179 173  173
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  38
Table 6B: Baseline specification (Japanese banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Constant   -13.862 -13.180** 0.141  -6.750***
   (1.20)  (2.34)  (0.83)  (5.32) 
Year dummies  1993 -1.427 -1.441 -0.024  -2.157***
   (0.74)  (1.11)  (0.47)  (8.06) 
  1994 -0.786 -0.290 0.004  -1.727***
   (0.64)  (0.26)  (0.10)  (6.86) 
  1995 -0.619 -0.248 -0.055  -1.270***
   (0.52)  (0.24)  (1.64)  (4.15) 
Regulatory pressure  REG 1.079 1.216 0.255***  -0.068
   (0.62)  (0.95)  (6.79)  (0.18) 
Control variables  SIZE 1.011 0.836** -0.004  0.664***
   (1.37)  (2.21)  (0.44)  (7.22) 
 LOANS  0.158* 0.113* 0.004**  0.154***
   (1.71)  (1.91)  (2.11)  (7.23) 
 LLOSS  -0.307 -0.475 -0.001  0.019
   (0.47)  (1.11)  (0.33)  (0.68) 
 ROA  -0.330 0.591*** 
    (0.86)   (10.70)  
 GROWTH  0.387 0.752* -0.027***  -0.039
   (0.51)  (1.89)  (3.75)  (0.68) 
 CAP(-1) -1.321** -0.079*** 
   (2.54)    (4.45)   
  ∆RISK  -0.908 0.040** 
   (0.99)    (2.49)   
 RISK(-1) -0.065   -0.139***
     (1.58)    (6.45) 
  ∆CAP  0.314  1.566**
     (1.00)    (2.32) 
R-squared   0.052 0.601 0.496  0.326
Number of observations  48 48 455  455
Note:  Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Year dummies for 1990, 1991 and 1992 are not included because of a lack of data   39
Table 6C: Baseline specification (US banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Constant   1.665 -3.203 1.825  -2.548
   (1.35)  (0.59)  (1.57)  (0.47) 
Year dummies  1992 -1.484 -7.076 -0.949  -7.256
   (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.42)  (0.70) 
  1993 -1.073 -3.857 -0.522  -3.537
   (0.51)  (0.41)  (0.26)  (0.39) 
  1994 -2.621 -8.629 -1.574  -8.163
   (0.85)  (0.63)  (0.54)  (0.61) 
  1995 -0.961 -2.554 -0.396  -2.243
   (0.44)  (0.26)  (0.19)  (0.24) 
Regulatory pressure  REG 0.931*** 0.096 1.523***  1.576
   (5.15)  (0.09)  (5.50)  (0.96) 
Control variables  SIZE -0.078** 0.498*** -0.072**  0.480***
   (2.12)  (2.76)  (2.07)  (2.70) 
 LOANS  0.006* 0.164*** 0.002  0.156***
   (1.86)  (9.93)  (0.66)  (9.43) 
 LLOSS  0.010 -0.070 0.008  -0.070
   (0.79)  (1.32)  (0.71)  (1.34) 
 ROA  0.152*** 0.141*** 
   (3.97)    (3.87)   
 GROWTH  0.743 3.321 0.417  3.145
   (1.20)  (1.21)  (0.71)  (1.18) 
 CAP(-1) -0.170*** -0.161*** 
   (7.79)    (7.93)   
  ∆RISK  -0.065*** -0.076*** 
   (2.91)    (3.80)   
 RISK(-1) -0.174***   -0.174***
     (10.44)  (10.89) 
  ∆CAP  -1.387**  -1.596***
     (2.35)    (2.75) 
R-squared   0.091 0.093 0.115  0.053
Number of observations  1,345 1,345 1,345 1,345
Note:  Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Year dummies for 1990 and 1991 are not included because of a lack of data   40
Table 7A: Alternative specification (non-US and non-Japanese banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Year dummies  1990 -0.317 -6.248* -0.284  -3.984*
    (0.89) (1.87) (0.95) (1.86) 
 1991  -0.130 -6.025* -0.051  -5.171**
    (0.36) (1.69) (0.17) (2.30) 
  1992 -0.044 -9.200*** -0.355  -6.378***
    (0.12) (2.76) (1.18) (2.89) 
 1993  0.038 -8.485*** -0.231  -7.613***
    (0.11) (2.61) (0.75) (3.68) 
 1994  0.308 -9.933*** -0.167  -8.614***
    (0.76) (3.04) (0.51) (4.14) 
 1995  -0.186 -10.891*** -0.291  -7.900***
    (0.50) (3.04) (0.97) (3.72) 
Country dummies  Canada 0.741 10.866 1.083  2.845
    (0.90) (1.35) (1.53) (0.50) 
 France  1.167 14.888** 1.496**  6.283
    (1.46) (1.98) (2.23) (1.21) 
 Italy 0.947 14.622* 1.433**  6.130
    (1.15) (1.90) (2.06) (1.18) 
 UK  1.219 12.325 1.110  3.963
    (1.50) (1.60) (1.63) (0.73) 
Regulatory pressure  REG * (1-MARKET)    -0.056 -0.605 0.008  -3.027
and market pressure    (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.85) 
  REG * MARKET 0.113 -1.887 -0.105  -1.870
    (0.42) (0.71) (0.46) (1.12) 
  (1-REG) * MARKET    0.026 -1.972 0.006  -1.728
    (0.12) (0.88) (0.03) (1.25) 
Control variables  SIZE -0.100* 0.073 -0.104**  0.417
    (1.71) (0.12) (2.05) (1.00) 
 LOANS  0.009 0.245*** 0.008  0.187***
    (1.03) (3.39) (1.17) (4.21) 
 LLOSS  0.049 -2.680** -0.075  -1.721*
    (0.26) (1.96) (0.52) (1.94) 
 ROA  0.591*** 0.536*** 
    (3.90)  (3.96)  
 GROWTH  -0.042 0.544 0.040  0.606**
    (0.73) (1.10) (0.89) (2.05) 
 CAP(-1) -0.096* -0.133*** 
    (1.94)  (3.01)  
  ∆RISK  0.132* -0.006 
    (1.78)  (0.15)  
  ∆RISK * REG  -0.139** -0.068** 
    (2.25)  (2.19)  
 RISK(-1) -0.270***   -0.191***
     (3.95)    (4.73) 
  ∆CAP  -3.638  1.206
     (0.85)    (0.43) 
  ∆CAP * REG  -0.196  -4.960*
     (0.05)    (1.85) 
R-squared   0.376 0.252 0.175  0.495
Number of observations  179 179 173  173
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  41
Table 7B: Alternative specification (Japanese banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Constant   -6.764*** -18.244*** 0.145  -6.451***
   (3.26)  (2.97)  (0.88)  (4.99) 
Year dummies  1993 -0.469 -1.246 -0.033  -2.175***
   (0.95)  (0.88)  (0.62)  (8.02) 
  1994 -0.534 -0.340 -0.002  -1.749***
   (1.35)  (0.30)  (0.06)  (6.86) 
  1995 -0.345 -0.194 -0.054  -1.329***
     (0.82)  (0.19)  (1.59)  (4.30) 
Regulatory pressure  REG * (1-MARKET)       - - 0.365***  -0.738
and market pressure                                -  -  (5.26)  (1.08) 
  REG * MARKET -0.354 -0.199 0.174***  -0.380
   (0.70)  (0.10)  (3.28)  (0.81) 
  (1-REG) * MARKET   -0.504*** -1.543* -0.045**  -0.261
   (1.99)  (1.77)  (1.97)  (1.33) 
Control variables  SIZE 0.645*** 1.467*** -0.001  0.676***
   (4.42)  (3.09)  (0.15)  (7.09) 
 LOANS  0.097*** 0.162*** 0.004**  0.158***
   (5.38)  (2.89)  (2.11)  (7.53) 
 LLOSS  0.058 -0.205 -0.001  0.020
   (0.36)  (0.48)  (0.24)  (0.71) 
 ROA  -0.225 0.619*** 
    (0.60)   (10.91)  
 GROWTH  -0.039 0.749 -0.029***  -0.041
   (0.26)  (1.49)  (3.97)  (0.71) 
 CAP(-1) -1.057*** -0.078*** 
    (9.57)  (4.22)  
  ∆RISK  -0.302** 0.038** 
    (2.51)  (2.11)  
  ∆RISK * REG  0.162 -0.004 
    (1.16)  (0.15)  
 RISK(-1) -0.133***   -0.146***
     (3.10)  (6.77) 
  ∆CAP  0.216  1.330**
     (0.67)  (1.97) 
  ∆CAP * REG  0.195  0.708
     (0.15)  (0.71) 
R-squared   0.685 0.608 0.513  0.356
Number of observations  48 48 455  455
Note:  Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Year dummies for 1990, 1991 and 1992 are not included because of a lack of data   42
Table 7C: Alternative specification (US banks) 
    CAP = Total capital to 
assets ratio 
CAP = Tier 1 capital to 
assets ratio 
   ∆CAP  ∆RISK  ∆CAP  ∆RISK 
Constant   1.754 -2.259 2.592**  -2.073
    (1.44) (0.41) (2.36) (0.40) 
Year dummies  1992 -1.522 -7.195 -0.307  -7.030
    (0.64) (0.68) (0.14) (0.70) 
  1993 -1.101 -3.860 -0.121  -3.239
    (0.53) (0.42) (0.06) (0.37) 
  1994 -2.727 -8.727 -0.935  -7.481
    (0.89) (0.64) (0.34) (0.58) 
  1995 -1.026 -2.567 -0.021  -1.941
    (0.47) (0.27) (0.01) (0.21) 
Regulatory pressure  REG * (1-MARKET)    0.641*** 0.632 1.180***  0.843
and market pressure    (3.06) (0.62) (3.54) (0.94) 
  REG * MARKET   1.024*** 2.665** 0.567  0.046
    (4.08) (2.16) (1.19) (0.09) 
  (1-REG) * MARKET     0.059 0.504 -0.018  -0.789***
    (0.60) (1.15) (0.21) (2.67) 
Control variables  SIZE -0.089** 0.397** -0.147***  0.390**
    (2.20) (2.05) (4.00) (2.14) 
 LOANS  0.005 0.168*** -0.002  0.157***
   (1.59)  (10.14)  (0.65)  (9.91) 
 LLOSS  0.012 -0.064 0.011  -0.066
    (1.00) (1.21) (0.98) (1.31) 
 ROA  0.152*** 0.173*** 
    (3.84)  (4.57)  
 GROWTH  0.767 3.354 0.249  3.006
    (1.25) (1.23) (0.45) (1.17) 
 CAP(-1) -0.168*** -0.201*** 
    (7.69)  (9.58)  
  ∆RISK  -0.044* -0.044** 
    (1.74)  (2.44)  
  ∆RISK * REG  -0.058** -0.101*** 
    (2.19)  (2.99)  
 RISK(-1) -0.182***   -0.175***
     (10.89)  (11.37) 
  ∆CAP  -1.459**  -1.301***
     (2.31)    (2.70) 
  ∆CAP * REG  -0.555  -1.764***
     (0.81)    (2.69) 
R-squared   0.130 0.030 0.347  0.312
Number of observations  1,345 1,345 1,345 1,345
Note:  Absolute t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Year dummies for 1990 and 1991 are not included because of a lack of data   43
































































































Table 1A: The 1988 Basel Accord (transitional and implementing arrangements) 
   End-1990  End-1992 
1.  Total capital ratio 
 
7.25 %  8 % 
2.  Tier 1 ratio  3.25 %  4% 
 
3.  Limit on general provision 
(or general loan loss reserves) 
in Tier 2 capital 
a   
Maximum 1.5 % or, 
exceptionally, up to 2% 
of Tier 2 capital 
Maximum 1.5 % or, 
exceptionally and 
temporarily, up to 2%    
of Tier 2 capital 
 
4.  Limit on term subordinated 
debt in Tier 2 capital 
No limit (at discretion)  Maximum 50% of Tier 1 
capital 
 
5.  Deduction for goodwill  Deducted from Tier 1 
capital (at discretion) 
Deducted from Tier 1 
capital 
Note: 
a In the event that no agreement was reached on the definition of unencumbered 
resources eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital 




Table 2A: Summary statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
∆CAP  1,566   0.32 1.40 -11.51   18.71
CAP(-1) 1,566    8.28 2.20 1.69    29.18
∆TIER  1,973   0.21 1.15 -12.26   17.06
TIER(-1) 1,973    6.21 2.20 1.04    22.59
∆RISK  1,973   0.19 5.53 -54.43   40.06
RISK(-1) 1,973    70.15 14.33 23.88    147.45
REG 1,973    0.17 0.38 0    1
MARKET 1,973    0.52 0.50 0    1
SIZE 1,973    8.91 1.58 4.38    13.63
LOANS 1,973    61.84 13.68 0.08    98.37
LLOSS 1,973    0.64 3.14 -5.70    99.67
ROA 1,973    0.88 0.87 -4.04    9.37
GROWTH 1,973    2.07 1.35 -3.98    5.17
Note:  CAP = Total capital to assets ratio; TIER = Tier 1 capital to assets ratio 
  All variables in % except SIZE (log of total assets) and REG and MARKET 
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We have that =  
 
Taking logs and differentiating with respect to time:  
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t dlog(CAR ) dlog(K ) dlog(RISK ) dlog(A )






We obtain easily that 
i,t i,t i,t i,t
i,t i,t i,t i,t
•
.. ..
CAR K RISK A
 
CAR K RISK A
- 
••
=-     
 
Note that equation (5) uses discrete time changes rather than time derivatives and is therefore 
only an approximation of the correct formula for the growth rate of capital adequacy ratios. 
 
 
 
 